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ABSTRACT. This paper reports an experiment based on the model of bilateral sequential bargaining 
over the distribution of a certain value in a laboratory setting within a real specific context of prop-
erty development in the Netherlands. We have involved only property development professionals as 
participants in the experiment who have experience with the context. We have also extended the ex-
periment into three different negotiation games distinguished by the availability of information to the 
participants: a negotiation game with incomplete information, asymmetric information, and complete 
information. We have found in this experiment that the availability of information could affect the 
plausibility to reach an agreement, particularly due to a restricted communication setting. This study 
also provides evidences that it is in the negotiators’ concern to reach an agreement with a fair outcome, 
which is defined here as the equilibrium, regardless the availability of the information to them.
KEYWORDS: Negotiation; Experiment; Strategic decision making behaviour; Land and real estate 
development
1. INTRODUCTION
It has been well-acknowledged that the practice 
of property or land and real estate development 
almost always involves negotiation processes, for 
instance between a municipality and a private de-
veloper, between a municipality or a private de-
veloper and a landowner, between a private devel-
oper and an institutional investor, et cetera. (Hea-
ley et al. 1995; Ennis 1997; Urbanavičienė et al. 
2009a). The concern in those negotiations may 
vary. It could be about the price to be paid for a 
piece of land, the contribution of a private devel-
oper to infrastructure costs (value capturing), the 
price to be paid for acquiring a completed building, 
or else (Adams 1994; Xu et al. 2012). A successful 
negotiation, including bargaining and making a 
compromise among stakeholders involved, clearly 
plays a crucial role in urban planning in general 
and to attain a successful land and real estate de-
velopment project in particular. A failure to make 
a good bargain among stakeholders involved will 
therefore most likely hamper land and real estate 
development processes. 
The study of negotiations as a bargaining pro-
cess has received much attention in different fields 
of disciplines. It mainly aims to help people to ne-
gotiate in a more effective way (Bazerman 1986; 
Thompson 1990). There has also been a growing 
interest in experimental work on bargaining (e.g. 
Ochs, Roth 1989; Weg, Zwick 1999; Binmore et al. 
2007), aiming to observe bargainers’ behaviour in 
a negotiation process. Although the literature on 
negotiation and bargaining in the field of urban 
planning and land and real estate development is 
extensive (see e.g. Ennis 1997; Farthing, Ashley 
2002; Ruming 2009; Urbanavičienė et al. 2009b), 
experimental studies of negotiation and bargain-
ing in this field are almost absent (with, however, 
a few notable exceptions, including Black, Diaz 
1996; Arentze, Timmermans 2003). The lack of 
attention to experimental approaches in negotia-
tion analysis related to urban planning and land * Corresponding author. E–mail: d.samsura@fm.ru.nl
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development is perhaps understandable because 
an experimental setting might not be able to cap-
ture all the complexities of the processes which 
are also very much context-driven. However, the 
relevance of negotiation experiments with real-life 
situations, especially related to urban planning 
and land development, is not trivial. Because of 
the difficulty in specifying the influence of unique 
factors of stakeholders’ behaviour on the outcome 
of the negotiation due to its intrinsic complexity, 
an experiment could be an appropriate tool to ob-
serve and to control the stakeholders’ responses 
under specific conditions. Hence, it might provide 
general insights about the behaviour of stakehold-
ers in a negotiation process and may even predict 
the outcome of negotiation processes under certain 
conditions. Moreover, an experimental approach 
also allows us to create a coherent structure for 
a line of argumentation. The setup of an experi-
ment allows the researcher to systematically and 
transparently study the specific experimental con-
ditions and the effects they have on the dependent 
variables as controlled as possible. This enables 
us to derive a clear and general conclusion about 
the relationship between the dependent and inde-
pendent variables that may lead to new insights 
or arguments regarding the clarification of the is-
sue under scrutiny. Surely the research strategy 
must be to perform a variety of mutually different 
experiments in order to approach the real-life situ-
ation. But we start simple and might therefore use 
the result of this study as the basis to explore more 
complex situations in a later stage.
Our purpose in this paper is to report on an 
experiment of negotiations in a laboratory setting 
between a public authority and a private real es-
tate developer with regard to a property develop-
ment process. This experiment attempts to observe 
and analyse actors’ strategic decision making be-
haviour in the negotiation process. For this experi-
ment we make reference to game-theoretical ex-
periments carried out in other fields of study. The 
negotiation is about the developer’s contribution 
to the costs of public works in the case of public 
infrastructure provision, assuming that this pub-
lic infrastructure is beneficial to the private devel-
oper’s investments in a specific land and property 
development project. The issue of value capturing 
in land and property development raises discus-
sions in almost every country (Van der Krabben, 
Needham 2008). The outcome of the negotiations 
however will very much depend on the institu-
tional context (planning legislation) in which the 
negotiations take place. We use the Dutch plan-
ning system and its specific institutional settings 
for land and property development as the context 
for the experiment in this paper. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, 
the set up of the experiment is discussed which 
include the general framework for the experiment, 
the context of the experiment which related to land 
and real estate development process, the conceptu-
alisation of general problems that are investigated 
in the experiment including some hypotheses for 
the analysis, and then followed by an explanation 
about the design of the experiment. Section 3 pro-
vides the results of the experiment and then they 
are discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 pre-
sents the conclusions that can be derived from our 
experimental study. 
2. THE EXPERIMENT
2.1. General framework 
The negotiation experiment in this study has been 
developed based on the model of bilateral sequen-
tial bargaining over the distribution of a certain 
value. In this kind of experimental models, the 
bargaining is limited to a certain period of time 
in which the bargainers have the opportunity to 
make alternate offers. Each of the bargainers can 
make an offer which the other may accept or re-
ject. If the offer is accepted, the bargaining pro-
cess ends and both bargainers receive their payoffs 
based on the accepted offer. If the offer is rejected 
before the negotiation time has ended, the other 
bargainer can make a new offer. The bargaining 
results in disagreement if no offer has been ac-
cepted when the bargaining time is ended. In that 
case both bargainers will receive nothing. 
Various studies of this kind of experiment have 
reported different results, sometimes quite con-
tradictive to one another especially regarding the 
issue of fairness. For instance, the work of Roth 
et al. (1981) confirms that bargainers tend to seek 
a fair result by agreeing to divide the outcome of 
the negotiation in equally-sound value. This result 
is common among studies in social psychology (see 
e.g. Major 1994; Jost et al. 2004). On the other 
hand, the work of Guth et al. (1982) suggests that 
the bargainers basically cannot be expected to per-
suade a fair division of the negotiation outcome. 
The issue of fairness has been an important 
topic of long debates in economics. The tradition-
al economic assumption of the profit-maximizing 
agents clearly expresses that fairness is irrelevant 
to economic analysis. The non-fairness assumption 
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implies a resistance to explanations of economic 
actions in moral terms. Reality, however, provides 
many examples indicating that people are also 
driven by fairness considerations and act more co-
operative than is assumed in the standard free ac-
tions of self-interested agents approaches. In this 
study, we also attempt to investigate the issue of 
fairness specifically in a negotiation process be-
tween a public authority and a private developer 
in a land and real estate development project. More 
about this issue will be explained in section 2.3.
It should be noted that most of the bargaining 
experiments, including those that are mentioned 
above, have two general features. First, they were 
carried out in a context-neutral setting by involv-
ing “general” participants (usually students, some-
times specifically from economics departments in a 
university), which basically is reasonable since the 
main purpose of those studies was to analyse the 
strategic economic behaviour of subjects in general 
bargaining situations. In our study, the context is 
more important than has been suggested in some 
previous general negotiation studies. The reason 
for this is that in our experiment, our concern is 
primarily with the negotiation about the extent 
to which the costs of public infrastructure provi-
sion related to land and property development are 
shared between the public and the private sector. 
We particularly specify this context within the 
Dutch institutional setting. Typical for land and 
property development in the Netherlands is the 
municipalities’ pro-active land policy and, in that 
context of active land policy, the application of the 
so-called building claim model. For that reason, in 
this study we use subjects from the field to ensure 
that the context could be brought into the experi-
ment by the participants. More explanation about 
this context will be provided in section 2.2.
The second general feature in a general bar-
gaining experiments is that the time period usu-
ally is limited to some definitive stages in exchang-
ing offers that should be made by the bargainers. 
Mostly, they even have only one stage of bargain-
ing as in the ultimatum bargaining game1. In 
the experiment conducted in this study, we only 
impose a time limit to do the bargaining process, 
1 The ultimatum bargaining game is a form of bargaining in 
which two players interact to decide how to divide a sum of 
money that is given to them. The first player proposes how 
to divide the sum between the two players, and the second 
player can either accept or reject this proposal. If the second 
player rejects, neither player receives anything. If the second 
player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal. 
The game is played only once so that reciprocation is not an 
issue.
but there is no limitation on how many stages the 
bargainers can make in exchanging offers.
2.2. Context of the experiment
In order to pro-actively implement their planning 
goals, Dutch municipalities often actively purchase 
all required land from its original landowners to be 
developed as officially stated in a land use plan. 
After that the municipality readjusts the parcels 
into building plots suitable for the desired develop-
ment, then services the land by providing neces-
sary infrastructures and utilities, and finally re-
leases the parcels to developers and/or end users 
(Van der Krabben, Jacobs 2013). Municipalities 
charge full market prices for the building plots 
(based on residual valuations) and they use the 
income from the building plot sales to cover the 
costs of the public infrastructure provision.
A condition for the successful implementation 
of this active land policy is that the municipal-
ity must assemble all land in the plan area, to be 
able to gain sufficient income from the building 
plot sales to cover the public infrastructure costs. 
In some situations2, however, private developers 
that have an intention to build houses or any other 
real-estate development have been able to acquire 
land in the plan area before the municipality was 
able to do so. In those cases, a so-called building 
claim model or strategy has been (and still is) 
applied. The strategy involves an agreement be-
tween the private developer and the municipality 
that the private developer sells his land to the mu-
nicipality (so that the municipality has complete 
ownership of the land in the plan area) without 
trying to make any profit (the selling price is usu-
ally very similar to what the private developer had 
previously paid for it), but under the condition that 
the private developer holds a building claim that 
guarantees him both the first right to buy the ser-
viced land from the municipality and a building 
permit to build real estate properties on it. Espe-
cially in the case of residential area development, 
the building claim model also involves an agree-
ment between the developer and the municipal-
ity regarding the number and type of houses that 
can be built on the land3 and the infrastructure, 
public utilities and public space that will be pro-
2 For reasons that we leave out of this paper. See Needham 
(2007) and Van der Krabben, Jacobs (2013) for a detailed 
explanation of the developments that took place on the Dutch 
land market.
3 The number of houses that the private developer will be al-
lowed to build usually depends on the size of its land posi-
tion (roughly, 1 hectare of land will give a building claim of 
around 30 houses).
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vided (at the cost of the municipality). Sometimes, 
the municipality and private developer may agree 
that the building plots that will be sold to the pri-
vate developer are located somewhere else in the 
planned development area (not exactly the same 
location, where the private developer previously 
held its land position). By participating in the 
building claim model, the private developer will 
benefit from a high-quality location, ‘provided’ by 
the municipality, for profitable property develop-
ment and, at the same time, excludes competitors 
from the market (Altes 2006). Usually, the above 
negotiations take place with respect to very large 
residential developments (5,000 to even 25,000 
houses built on one location). Various private de-
velopers – and also housing associations – may 
hold land positions here and also the municipality 
itself usually has been able to acquire land. The 
municipality will negotiate with each of the land 
holding private developers individually regarding 
the sale of “raw land” from the private developer to 
the municipality and the sale of serviced building 
plots with the building claim from the municipality 
to the same private developer. In those situations, 
the negotiation between the municipality and the 
private developer does not only concern the price 
of the raw land to be paid for the land to be pur-
chased by the municipality, but also the price of 
serviced land to be sold back by the municipality 
to the land developer. The latter negotiation – on 
which our experiment will be focused on – can be 
considered as a value capturing negotiation: the 
higher the price the private developer agrees to 
pay for the serviced building plots, the better the 
municipality is able to cover its costs of public in-
frastructure provision. Those negotiations have 
been characterised as a lengthy processes and in 
many times resulted in disagreement which even-
tually drove the development project into a failure 
(Van der Krabben, Needham 2008; Muñoz-Gielen 
2011).
2.3. Problem conceptualisation  
and hypothesis
As mentioned earlier, this experiment concerns 
about observing, through a simulation, actors’ stra-
tegic decision making behaviour in a negotiation 
process also with regard to the issue of fairness 
that occurs specifically between a municipality and 
a private developer over the price of serviced land 
in land and real estate development process based 
on the Dutch building claim model. Fairness is not 
an easy issue to define because what counts as fair 
in different societies and different situations might 
vary as much as the discrepancy of humans pref-
erences and behaviours. In many social systems 
fairness might also be perceived as a form of jus-
tice and there are many types of justice principles 
that can be identified in social science literature 
(Cook, Hegtvedt 1983). Among those principles, we 
can make a general distinction between equity and 
distributive principles of justice or fairness. The 
equity principle involves notions of exchange and 
is defined as the equivalence of the ratio of out-
come and inputs of all parties involved in the ex-
change (Adams 1965). Suppose there are only two 
parties (A and B) engaged in the exchange of two 
valued resources, for instance x that is provided 
by A and y that is provided by B. In this case, x is 
perceived as A’s input to exchange and also as B’s 
outcome, while y is perceived as B’s input and A’s 
outcome. The equity principle is then said to exist 
if the ratio of outcome and input, for both A and 
B, is equal. 
The second principle of justice, i.e. the distribu-
tive principle, concerns general fairness in alloca-
tion situations. Allocation occurs when one party 
tries to distribute a value – could be as a reward, 
a resource, rights, obligations, etc. – to an array 
of recipients. As argued by Eckhoff (1974), both 
exchange and allocation processes can actually 
be combined, as he defined exchange as a special 
class of allocation in which the distribution mecha-
nism is the two-way transfer of mutual benefits. 
The form of equality as in the equity principle is 
therefore also upheld in the distribution process 
which then can be conceived as the equality princi-
ple. Homans (1958) emphasized this rule of equal-
ity in a distribution mechanism as a condition of 
equilibrium. In this study, we also use this notion 
of equal distribution to analyse fairness. With re-
gard to the negotiations between a municipality 
and a private developer over the price of serviced 
land in property development, we therefore at-
tempt to investigate whether both parties are con-
cerned about fairness. This could be confirmed by 
an equilibrium of the negotiation outcome based 
on the equal distribution principle. 
In addition to the principle above, many stud-
ies have demonstrated that actors’ preferences for 
fairness are also related to the availability of in-
formation. For instance, Hoffman et al. (1994) and 
Straub and Murnighan (1995) have found in ex-
periments that agents or bargainers tend to made 
much smaller offers when they know that their 
opponents’ cannot observe their actions. They also 
confirm that bargainers have a tendency to agree 
on a fair outcome when they have information 
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about the amount being divided in the bargaining 
situation. In this study, we use this contention as 
a hypothesis for the observation in the experiment, 
hence we expect that with increased availability 
of information, the parties in a bargaining process 
will be more inclined to fairness. Furthermore, we 
might also reasonably expect that, prior to having 
a fair outcome, the availability of information will 
also affect the bargainers’ possibility to reach an 
agreement and to increase negotiation efficiency, 
in terms of time or stages needed for the negotia-
tion. The hypotheses of this study can therefore be 
formulated as follow:
H1: The more available the information is, the 
more plausible it will be that the bargaining par-
ties will reach an agreement.
H2: The more available the information is, the 
lesser number of stages of negotiation will be need-
ed by the bargaining parties to reach an agree-
ment. 
H3: The more available the information is, the 
more inclined the bargaining parties will be to 
reach a fair agreement.
2.4. Experimental design and procedures
Our experiment deals with the negotiation that 
takes place between a municipality and a landhold-
ing private developer. The negotiation is specifically 
concerning the price per m2 paid for serviced build-
ing plots as part of a greenfield residential develop-
ment. The process of the negotiation takes place, as 
we explained earlier, at the time that the private 
developer agrees to sell the raw land that he owns 
to the municipality. As an exchange for the build-
ing right to claim back the land by buying it from 
the municipality, the private developer must pay 
this price at a certain time in the future, after the 
land has been serviced and public infrastructure 
has been provided, when he/she can really start to 
build houses. Although the building claim model is 
quite common now in residential development pro-
jects in the Netherlands, we are aware of the fact 
that it can still be quite complicated to fully under-
stand it by non-involved participants in the experi-
ment. In order to make sure that this context for 
the experiment is taken into account, we therefore 
have involved only planning and land and prop-
erty development professionals as participants in 
the experiment. These participants all worked with 
(different) urban planning consultancy companies 
in the Netherlands and have experience with active 
land policy and the implementation of the building 
claim model. Since it is also not something uncom-
mon in the Netherlands that municipalities as well 
as private developers uses the service of consult-
ant to represent them in negotiation processes as 
illustrated in our experiment, all participants can 
freely choose their role in the experiments either 
as a municipality or a private developer. The par-
ticipants were invited through an open invitation 
to their company. A total of 20 participants were 
involved in this experiment who performed 90 ne-
gotiation processes (see section 3).
The experiment was developed based on linear 
bilateral distributive negotiation model of Raiffa 
(1982). In this model, there are only two players 
involved. Let’s assume these players are a seller 
(S) and a buyer (B). Both player should at least 
have the information about their own reservation 
price (namely RS and RB for S and B respective-
ly) to be able to make a negotiation. For S, this 
reservation price means the minimum price he/
she could accept; and oppositely for B, it means 
the maximum price he/she could afford. A nego-
tiation can therefore never have an agreement if 
RS>RB. The positive interval between RS and RB, 
i.e. RB – RS, expresses the zone of possible agree-
ment (ZOPA). In the case of equal power position 
between S and B, the equilibrium is defined by 
the equal division of the difference between the 
reservation prices of S and B or (RB – RS) / 2, i.e. 
the middle value of ZOPA. 
In order to apply this bargaining in an experi-
ment, as mentioned earlier, we went beyond the 
common bargaining games experiments which 
usually involve only one exchanging stage, by im-
posing a limitation only on the time of bargaining 
and not on the stages of bargaining. The bargain-
ers can thus make as many sequential exchanging 
offers as necessary to them within the time limits 
for the negotiation. In addition to that, we also 
have extended the experiment into three different 
negotiation games distinguished by the informa-
tion that is available to the participants: a negotia-
tion game with incomplete information (Game 1), 
a negotiation game with asymmetric information 
(Game 2), and a negotiation game with complete 
information (Game 3). By playing these three dif-
ferent games, we expect to find differences in the 
bargainers’ decision behaviour related to the avail-
ability of information.
The Session was conducted in the NSM Deci-
sion Lab at Radboud University Nijmegen4, where 
subjects were seated in isolated cubicles in front of 
computer terminals that were connected through 
a computer network. In this experiment, the sub-
jects were thus doing the negotiations via comput-
4 http://www.ru.nl/fm/decisionlab/ 
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ers anonymously without knowing their opponents 
and without having any opportunity to communi-
cate with them. With this setting, we could have 
more control on the results of the experiment by 
minimising the influence of such emotional factors 
including personal persuasion or intimidation as 
well as any consideration about external issues, 
and hence we could expect that the bargainers 
would make their decisions as best as they can 
based on their experiences and knowledge as the 
real experts and professional from the field. 
The experiment was programmed using the z-
Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). The program 
assigned the subjects in a random way to play ei-
ther a role as a municipality or a private developer 
and coupled them into ten groups. Once a subject 
is assigned to play a certain role, he/she sticks to 
this role for the whole experiment. Moreover, three 
treatments or games were run accordingly to the 
three different negotiation games mentioned ear-
lier. Each game was run for three rounds, hence 
there were nine negotiations rounds in total. In 
each round, the program also randomly changed 
all the groups; therefore each subject made the ne-
gotiation with a different opponent. The negotiation 
time in each round was limited to six minutes. At 
the end of each round, all subjects were asked to 
written down their motivations in having or not 
having an agreement via the computer. It should be 
noted that the six minutes time in this experiment 
is chosen arbitrarily to give a limit to the negotia-
tion process. However, in this study we focus on the 
information condition and the payoff; time limit is 
then only treated as a constant and not as an ex-
perimental condition. 
All subjects were provided with relevant finan-
cial information targeted to their role, based on 
hypothetical land development projects. Based on 
the three different games that were played in this 
experiment, three different availability levels of 
financial information were given to the subjects 
as if they were involved in three different land 
development projects. The financial information 
for the municipalities was about the total costs 
to prepare the land with necessary public infra-
structures and also the reservation price or the 
minimum price that they could accept from the 
private developer to avoid financial loss from the 
negotiation5. The financial information for the pri-
vate developers contains the costs for developing 
the land with houses as well as the expected reve-
5 A loss will occur when the total revenues of the sale of the 
building plots is lower than the total costs for the municipal-
ity, consisting of the acquisition costs for the raw land and 
the costs for the public works.
nues from selling the houses to end-users and the 
reservation price or the maximum price they could 
accept to buy the serviced land from the munici-
pality in order to avoid financial loss6. It should 
be noted here that the reservation price of mu-
nicipalities will always be lower than the private 
developers’ reservation price in order to make it 
possible for both parties to make an agreement. 
The reservation prices of each bargainer in each 
game are given in Table 1. 
Expected profits for the municipality and the 
private developer were also included in their cor-
responding financial information, to give the bar-
gainers some ideas about the price they would like 
to offer or accept in the negotiation. The residual 
valuation method which is usually employed in the 
financial appraisal of land and property develop-
ment projects were used here to calculate the ex-
pected profits (Morley 2002). The expected profit 
is expressed as a certain percentage from the total 
development costs. These profit percentages are 
considered in this experiment as the utility of the 
negotiation outcome to the corresponding bargain-
ers. All participants were aware that in the end of 
the session, real money would be offered to them in 
proportion with the profit they made in the experi-
ment. By doing this, we expected that they would 
be playing their role more seriously in the experi-
ment, showing similar behaviour as they do in real 
life situations. 
The level of financial information that was 
available to the players varied in each game. All 
subjects in Game 1 were only provided with the 
financial information accordingly to his/her role. In 
Game 2, the subjects who play as private develop-
ers had both the financial information concerning 
their own position and concerning the municipali-
ties’ position, while the subjects who played as mu-
nicipalities only had access to the financial infor-
mation concerning their own position. In Game 3, 
all subjects were provided with both the financial 
information regarding their own position and their 
opponent’s position. 
6 A loss will occur when the total revenues of the sale of the 
houses is lower than the total costs for the private developer, 
consisting of the acquisition costs of the serviced building 
plots and the building costs.
Table 1. Reservation prices of bargainers
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
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3. RESULTS
In this section, we present the data obtained from 
the experiment. The observation focused on three 
main features of bargaining outcomes, including 
(1) the final prices that were set in the negotia-
tions with an agreement, (2) the number of nego-
tiations that reached an agreement and that did 
not, and (3) the number of stages to reach that 
agreement. There were 30 negotiations for each 
game, and thus in total there were 90 negotiation 
results from this experiment. 
3.1. Number of agreements
The results of the observation regarding the num-
ber of negotiations that reached an agreement or 
not are presented in Table 2. It shows that the 
number of disagreements increases from Game 1 
to Game 3. Intriguingly, in round 1 of Game 3, 
there were only two groups out of ten that were 
able to reach an agreement. With this result, we 
should reject our first hypothesis (H1) that says the 
more available the information, the more plausible 
it will be that the bargaining parties will reach an 
agreement. In other words, the results of the ex-
periment have gave us an interesting understand-
ing that apparently the availability of information 
does not necessarily make the bargainers easier 
to reach an agreement. On the contrary, it appar-
ently makes it harder for them to do so. 
In order to statistically prove that the differenc-
es in the availability of information in the games 
significantly cause the different results in reach-
ing an agreement or not, we applied Cochran’s Q 
test from non-parametric statistics, since we do not 
have any assumption about the distribution of the 
data. The results of the test for the three games 
are given in Table 3. Intriguingly, with a = 0.05, 
the test confirms that the availability of informa-
tion affects the decision of bargainers to reach an 
agreement only for round 1, but not for the whole 
game. These results will be discussed in more de-
tail in section 4. 
3.2. Negotiation stages 
Regarding the number of negotiation stages, av-
erage numbers clearly decline from Game 1 to 
Game 3 (Fig. 1). It means that we should accept 
our second hypothesis (H2) that says the more 
available the information, the lesser number of 
stage negotiation needed by the bargaining parties 
to reach an agreement. Assuming that the nego-
tiation can be considered as more efficient if an 
agreement can be reached using less stages, these 
results may confirm that the availability of infor-
mation to the bargainers does increase the efficien-
cy of the negotiation. 
Table 2. Number of negotiations with and without agreements
Number of negotiations
With agreement Without agreement Total
Game 1: incomplete information Round 1 7 3 10
Round 2 7 3 10
Round 3 7 3 10
Total 21 9 30
Game 2: asymmetric information Round 1 8 2 10
Round 2 5 5 10
Round 3 4 6 10
Total 17 13 30
Game 3: complete information Round 1 2 8 10
Round 2 6 4 10
Round 3 7 3 10
Total 15 15 30
Fig 1. Average of negotiation stages in each game
Game 2: 
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3.3. Final prices
Concerning the agreed final prices that came out 
of the negotiations, it was investigated whether the 
prices could confirm or preclude the equilibrium, 
especially one that is expected to promote an equal 
division of negotiation outcome. The equilibrium in 
this experiment is calculated based on a refinement 
of Raiffa’s approach (1982). While Raiffa’s approach 
would calculate the equilibrium price by equally 
dividing the difference between the municipality’s 
and private developer’s reservation prices, in our 
experiment we calculated the equilibrium in each 
game by finding the price that yields an equal util-
ity for both players (PE) which, as mentioned ear-
lier, is the profit percentage to the corresponding 
total costs of both the municipality and the private 
developer.
The general description of the final prices of 
each game that were observed from the experi-
ment as well as their corresponding expected equi-
librium prices and the bargainers’ utilities at the 
equilibrium prices are given in Table 4. Further-
more, the average values of the agreed final prices 
from round to round for Game 1 to Game 3 are 
given in Figure 2 to Figure 4 respectively, show-
ing the tendency of the agreed final prices towards 
their corresponding equilibriums.
From Table 4, we can find that the average of 
final prices of Game 2 and Game 3 are very close 
to their equilibriums compared to Game 1 which 
means that the propensity of the bargainers to 
seek a fair result is more apparent in these two 
games. In order to prove the significance of the 
agreed final prices in each game related to its cor-
responding equilibrium, we conducted the Wilcox-
on signed-rank test from non-parametric statistics 
(again, because we do not have any assumption 
about the distribution of the data). The results of 
the test indicate that, at the a = 0.05 level of sig-
nificance, there is sufficient evidence to claim that 
in Game 2 and 3 the bargainers had significantly 
settled an agreement at the equilibrium prices (Ta-
ble 5). However, although we cannot conclude that 
in the Game 1 the bargainers were reaching the 
equilibrium, its significance value still suggests 
that it is very close, because the value is exactly 
in the threshold of rejecting the claim.
Meanwhile from Figure 2 to Figure 4, we can-
not draw a clear conclusion whether the average 
final prices from round to round in each game have 
Table 3. Cochran’s Q test results













Game 1: incomplete information 7 3 7 3 7 3
Game 2: asymmetric information 8 2 5 5 4 6
Game 3: complete information 2 8 6 4 7 3
Cochran’s Q 6.2 0.857 2.25
df 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. 0.045 0.651 0.325
Table 4. Final prices for each game






Final prices of Game 1: incomplete information 21 265.00 307.00 278.29 9.61 282.24 8.6
Final prices of Game 2: asymmetric information 17 245.00 269.00 257.50 6.78 257.61 7.3
Final prices of Game 3: complete information 15 291.00 294.00 293.00 0.91 293.13 4.7
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a tendency to move closer to their corresponding 
equilibrium or not, except perhaps in Game 3. 
In Game 3, the trend clearly moves towards the 
equilibrium, while even the average final prices 
almost equals the equilibrium in round 3. How-
ever, although for Game 2 the trend is not very 
clear (Fig. 3), it is interesting to see that still the 
average final prices for this game are exception-
ally close to the equilibrium in all rounds. As the 
results of this experiment confirm that in all three 
games, the outcomes of the bargaining are close to 
the equilibrium. This means that the bargainers 
are trying to obtain the fair outcome regardless 
the availability of information to them. We there-
fore do not have a strong argument to accept our 
third hypothesis (H3) that says the more available 
the information is, the more inclined the bargaining 
parties will be to reach a fair agreement. 
4. DISCUSSION
As we mentioned above, the results of the experi-
ment show that the number of disagreements in-
crease from Game 1 to Game 3. This suggests that 
in the first iteration, the bargainers find it more 
difficult to reach an agreement when they have 
more information regarding the financial condi-
tions of their opponents. These results are in con-
trast with results from earlier research, showing 
instead a positive effect of the availability of infor-
mation to the extent in which the bargainers’ can 
reach an agreement (e.g.: Hurwicz 1972; Selten 
1978; Roth, Murnighan 1982). Referring to one of 
the fundamental assumptions in game theory – a 
rational play depends on the availability of the 
relevant information regarding both the structure 
of the game and the utility function of the play-
ers – we would assume that an agreement, as a 
rational outcome of the bargaining process, might 
be expected to transpire in this experiment when 
the bargainers have a common knowledge about 
complete information. The evidence that was found 
in this experiment may therefore suggest that the 
bargainers act less rational when they have com-
plete information. The subjects in the experiment 
motivated their tendency not to reach an agree-
ment anymore after having full information about 
their opponents’ financial position by arguing that 
they tend to distrust their opponents. With full 
information about their opponents’ financial situ-
ation they were able to find out that their oppo-
nents have asked “too much”. Their response was 
to punish their opponents by increasing their bids 
as well, considering this as a fair response even 
though these responses may lead to disagreement. 
We assume that in the situation of incomplete in-
formation, the trust problem does not exist – or 
at least to a lesser extent – simply because the 
subjects do not really know what is “too much” for 
the opponent. However, as we found that the effect 
of information availability to the bargainers’ pro-
pensity to reach an agreement is not significant in 
the second and the third iteration of the bargain-
ing process, we might conclude that the repetition 
of the bargaining process gives the bargainers an 
equal opportunity in all the three games to learn 
from their previous attempts, in order to have a 
better outcome by reaching an agreement.
It is also interesting to note that, although the 
observation of the number of agreements/disagree-
ments shows that the subjects were evidently not 
behaving in a rational way, the results of the ex-
periment considering the final prices prove other-
Table 5. Wilcoxon signed-rank test results









Z –1.964 –0.071 –0.573
Asymp. Sig. 0.05 0.943 0.567
Fig 4. Final prices of Game 3 for each round
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wise. Regardless the availability of information, 
in each game the bargainers tended to be more 
rational in reaching a fair outcome, demonstrated 
by the fact that the results were getting closer to 
the corresponding equilibrium. This claim is not 
only confirmed by the statistical test, but also by 
the subjects’ explanations in which they stated 
that they had indeed the intention to look for a 
fair outcome. They also stated that the fact that 
they could not communicate their intentions to one 
another during the experiment made it difficult for 
them to assess their opponent’s intentions. Since 
the only way to communicate in this experiment is 
by offering a bid, the bargainers found it hard to 
trust their opponents that they wanted to reach a 
fair outcome (i.e. the equilibrium) from the nego-
tiation as well, when the opponent made an offer 
that is too far away from the equilibrium, which 
in the end could ruin the negotiation. These find-
ings might permit us to speculate that due to the 
lack of communication between the bargainers, 
the more information that is available to them, 
the more suspicious they are in trusting their op-
ponents.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has reported an experiment about three 
different two-person bargaining processes in which 
different levels of financial information availability 
are used as stimuli in a laboratory setting. Specific 
contexts together with specific subjects were used 
in the experiment in order to give us a possibil-
ity to specifically observe the bargaining process 
in land and property development, particularly re-
garding value capturing for public infrastructure 
provision. 
The results of the experiment have confirmed 
that, with the specific contexts introduced to the 
negotiation, both the availability of information 
and the (lack of) communication opportunities play 
an important role especially to the bargainers’ pro-
pensity to reach an agreement and to the efficiency 
of the bargaining. We have learned from the pre-
sent study that the more information is available 
to the bargainers, the more difficult it is to them 
to reach an agreement, particularly in a situation 
that communication is restricted. This study also 
provides evidence that it is in the bargainers’ con-
cerns to reach an agreement with a fair outcome, 
which is defined here as the equilibrium, regard-
less the availability of the information to them. 
A fair outcome, in the context of the experiment, 
means that private developers from their side are 
willing to pay a good price for the building plots 
(thus contributing to the costs of public infrastruc-
ture provision) and that municipalities accept the 
commercial drive of the private developers to make 
a profit out of the development. A bit speculating 
on this outcome, one could argue that legislation 
for value capturing in land and property devel-
opment – available in some countries, including 
the Netherlands, but not in other countries – is 
perhaps not necessary, since municipalities and 
private developers often have a mutual interest 
in reaching an agreement about planned develop-
ments, including private sector contributions to 
public infrastructure costs.
Although this study may provide some insights 
about the strategic negotiation behaviour of stake-
holders in land and property development process-
es, the conclusions should still be received with 
much caution. To achieve a more robust general 
conclusion, it is important to run the experiment 
in many repetitions with more variation in amount 
and nature of information, while at the same time, 
more contextual factors should be taken into ac-
count in the bargaining process to make it closer to 
the real world. We are thus fully aware about the 
limitations of this study. For instance, we used a 
specific timeframe for the negotiation in the experi-
ment which might have an influence to the players’ 
behaviour and also the results of the negotiation. 
In this particular study we did not specifically fo-
cus our analysis on time variable; in future studies, 
it might be an issue to include this focus too. In ad-
dition to that issue, the results of this experiments 
might be influenced by the specific Dutch context. 
Therefore, in the future, the same research can 
be conducted in different countries with different 
cultures and contexts to enable an international 
comparison and generate more general conclusions. 
Another issue concerns the computer-based meth-
odology that we deliberately and fully consciously 
used in this experiment to avoid the influence of 
emotional factors including personal persuasion 
or intimidation as well as any consideration about 
external issues which certainly play an important 
role in real-life negotiation processes. Surely these 
variables have their own right to be analysed which 
might be an important agenda for future research. 
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